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Abstract
Wireless sensor networks are often constructed as asym-
metric networks comprised of a large number of small,
resource-constrained sensor nodes and a small number of
relatively powerful base stations. A base station is vulner-
able as a central point of failure in such networks. Typical
packet trafc in a sensor network reveals pronounced pat-
terns that allow an adversary analyzing packet trafc to de-
duce the location of a base station, which can then be dis-
abled or destroyed. This paper investigates multiple anti-
trafc analysis techniques aimed at disguising the location
of a base station. First, a degree of randomness is intro-
duced in the multi-hop path a packet takes from a sensor
node to a base station. Second, random fake paths are in-
troduced to confuse an adversary from tracking a packet as
it moves towards a base station. Finally, multiple, random
areas of high communication activity are created to deceive
an adversary as to the true location of the base station. The
paper evaluates these techniques analytically and via sim-
ulation using three evaluation criteria: total entropy of the
network, total energy consumed, and the ability to guard
against heuristic-based techniques to locate a base station.
1 Introduction
A wireless sensor network (WSN) consists of a large
number of small, resource-constrained sensor nodes, e.g.
Berkeley MICA2 motes [11], and a small number of rel-
atively powerful base stations, e.g. PC-caliber gateways.
Each sensor node acts as an information source, sensing
and collecting data samples from its environment. Each
sensor node communicates this data to a base station via
a multi-hop network in which each node performs routing
functions.
Sensor data is typically routed along relatively fixed
paths from sensor nodes towards the base station. This pro-
duces quite pronounced traffic patterns that reveal the direc-
tion towards and hence the location of the base station. Fig-
ure 1 illustrates the packet traffic volume forwarded by each
node in the network with the shortest path routing scheme
(we call it as SP scheme). The nodes nearer the base sta-
tion clearly forward a significantly greater volume of pack-
ets than nodes further away from the base station, in the
same manner that a river grows wider as it collects more wa-
ter from its tributaries. Aggregator nodes that compress the
data from multiple child nodes before forwarding upstream
towards the base station can mitigate the pronounced in-
crease in traffic volume towards the base station. However,
the data traffic still accumulates towards the base station, if
the aggregators send their data through multiple hops.
An adversary can analyze the traffic patterns revealed in
Figure 1 to deduce the location of the base station within the
WSN’s topology. Since the base station is a central point of
failure, once the location of the base station is discovered,
an adversary can disable or destroy the base station, thereby
rendering ineffective the data-gathering duties of the entire
sensor network. Even if there are multiple base stations, an
adversary can employ the same traffic analysis techniques
to take out each base station one by one, until the entire
network is disabled.
Even if the contents of data packets are encrypted, e.g.
by pair-wise key schemes [8, 3, 7, 15, 25], an adversary
can still deduce significant information by monitoring traf-
fic volume and traffic path information in sensor network.
Here, we identify two traffic analysis attacks in wireless
sensor networks, rate monitoring attack and time correla-
tion attack. In rate monitoring attack, an adversary can
monitor the packet sending rate of nodes near the adversary,
and always moves closer to the nodes that have a higher
packet sending rate. In time correlation attack, an adver-
sary observes the correlation in sending time between one
node and a neighbor node that is assumed to be forward-
ing the same packet, and deduces the path by following the
“sound” of each forwarding operation as the packet propa-
gates towards the base station. Sensor nodes can defend this
attack by buffering incoming packet for random period be-
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(a) 3-D graph of data traffic. (b) Contour map of data traffic.
Figure 1. Pronounced data trafc patterns in a WSN reveal the location of the base station.
fore forwarding it. However, an adversary can pro-actively
trigger the forwarding of packets by generating abnormal
sensory events, e.g. abnormal temperature, that need to be
forwarded as quickly as possible.
In this paper, we focus on developing countermeasures
against traffic analysis attacks that seek to locate the base
station, particularly the rate monitoring attack and time
correlation attack. Without loss of generality, we con-
sider sensor networks with a single base station. The anti-
traffic analysis techniques proposed in this paper introduce
randomized traffic volumes throughout the sensor network
away from the base station, in order to deceive and mis-
direct an adversary so that the true path towards the base
station cannot be easily found. Four anti-traffic analysis
techniques are proposed to generate randomness. First, a
multiple parent routing scheme is introduced that allows
a sensor node to forward a packet to one of multiple par-
ents. This makes the patterns less pronounced in terms of
routing packets towards the base station. Second, a con-
trolled random walk is introduced into the multi-hop path
traversed by a packet through the WSN towards the base
station. This distributes packet traffic, thereby rendering
less effective rate monitoring attacks. Third, random fake
paths are introduced to confuse an adversary from track-
ing a packet as it moves towards a base station. This miti-
gates the effectiveness of time correlation attacks. Finally,
multiple, random areas of high communication activity are
created to deceive an adversary as to the true location of
the base station, which further increases the difficulty of
rate monitoring attacks. We have analyzed our anti-traffic
analysis techniques against rate monitoring and time corre-
lation attacks. However, we believe that they can withstand
other unforeseen traffic analysis attacks as well by virtues of
providing increased randomness in communication patterns
and increased deceptive mechanisms to confuse an adver-
sary.
These anti-traffic analysis techniques are specially suited
to the characteristics of wireless sensor networks, and ex-
hibit several advantages. First, all four techniques are dis-
tributed in nature. There is no single initialization or coor-
dination point involved to setup these mechanisms. Second,
memory and computation requirements in each sensor node
are relatively low, and can easily be met by modern sensors
such as MICA2. Third, any compromise of one or a small
number of sensor nodes by an adversary is easily tolerated.
If an adversary compromises some nodes, the damage it can
inflict upon the WSN is limited. Fourth, our techniques
don’t require a node to delay sending packets, as would be
the case in standard de-correlation approaches. A node can
send/forward its packet as soon as it is ready. This aids in
reducing the time delay introduced by anti-traffic analysis
techniques. Finally, the cost of these techniques is moderate
and the techniques are applicable to large sensor networks.
This is confirmed by the simulation results presented in the
evaluation section.
Our techniques result in significantly delaying an adver-
sary from finding a base station. This delay is useful in
making WSNs more robust. For example, if an adversary
has to spend Ta units of time to find one base station, an end
user can continually use different base stations after every
Tb time units, where Tb < Ta. In the absence of any anti-
traffic analysis mechanisms, Ta is very small. As a result a
user will have to change base stations very frequently. Since
any change in base station consumes extra energy, e.g. to set
up new routing paths, this will cost lots of energy. The most
serious problem in our techniques is that they introduce ex-
tra messages in the network. Our experiments show that the
number of messages increases by about 2 to 3 times, while
the mechanisms delay the time of finding a base station by
about 19 times. While energy is certainly critical in sensor
networks, a tradeoff of significantly reducing the chances
of a base station being located at the cost of reducing the
battery lifetime by about half is quite reasonable for several
applications, e.g. military applications.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the net-
work model, threat model, and capabilities of sensor nodes
are described. In Section 3, the probabilistic countermea-
sures embedded into routing algorithms are described, and
an analysis of their security under node-compromise is pre-
sented. In Section 4, algorithms are simulated and quanti-
tatively measured in terms of their effectiveness and cost.
Section 5 discusses related work, and finally, Section 6 con-
cludes the paper.
2 Network Traffic and Threat Model
We assume the sensor network has a base station and a
number of aggregator nodes. Each aggregator node pro-
cesses data that it received from its group of local sen-
sor nodes and sends that processed data to the base station
through multiple hops.
For the capabilities of an adversary, we assume that an
adversary can monitor network traffic, and launch a rate
monitoring attack and a time correlation attack. An adver-
sary can capture sensor nodes, compromise them and obtain
all information, e.g. encryption keys, inside a node. Adver-
sary can reprogram a node and convert it into a malicious
node. However, we assume that adversary has to spend a
certain amount of time to compromise a node, and so he
can compromise only a small number of nodes in any rea-
sonable period of time. Paricularly, the time that he can
compromise all nodes along a path to base station is much
longer than the the base station replacement time Tb. We
also assume that an adversary can physically move from
one location to another in the network. However, it doesn’t
have global information about the whole network, and can-
not jam the entire network. Our scheme is useful for large
sensor network, so if adversary just enters the network, he
cannot see base station directly, although if he is close to
base station, he can identify base station immediately. We
call the area which adversary can immediately find base sta-
tion as base station area.
We assume that sensor nodes use the key framework pro-
posed in LEAP [25] to protect hop-by-hop communication.
Nodes can set up pair-wise keys using existing protocols
[8, 3, 7, 15, 25]. Every node can also set up a single cluster
key [25] with all of its neighbor nodes. As described in [5],
when a node sends a packet, it protects and encrypts the
packet with its cluster key. An adversary cannot decrypt the
contents of a packet. At the same time, other nodes in the
cluster can easily understand the type of packet and process
it accordingly.
In this paper, we focus on protecting the data traffic from
aggregator nodes to base station through multiple hop rout-
ing. The local data traffic between sensor nodes and aggre-
gator node can be protected by anti-traffic analysis schemes
proposed in [5].
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Figure 2. Neighbors and parents of node u.
Figure shows node ID and its level value. In
SP, node u has one parent node v1. In MPR,
node u has two parent nodes, v1 and v6. In
RW routing, u will forward packet to v1 or v6
with probability Pr , and with probability 1 −
Pr , it will randomly forward the packet to any
neighbor node v1 to v6.
3 Anti-traffic analysis strategies
3.1 Multi-parent routing scheme
To reduce the starkness of pronounced paths, we mod-
ify the shortest path (SP) routing scheme shown in Figure 1
by having each node select one of multiple parent nodes to
route data to the base station. When a node needs to for-
ward a packet, the node randomly selects one of its parent
nodes to forward the packet. We call this scheme multi-
parent routing (MPR). We propose two methods for setting
up multiple parents for each node. In the first method (See
Figure 2), the beacon message sent by the base station con-
tains a level field. The base station sets the value of level
to 0. When a node forwards a beacon message, it incre-
ments it by 1. So the value of level represents the number
of hops that a node is from the base station along a particu-
lar path. A sensor node s selects all neighbor nodes whose
level value is less than s’s level value as its parent nodes. In
the second method, a node monitors all beacon messages it
receives before forwarding the first beacon message. Since
a node s has to wait for some amount of time before for-
warding a beacon message (waiting time in MAC layer), it
selects all nodes from whom it receives a beacon message
while waiting to forward the first received beacon message
as its parent nodes.
An adversary has several ways to attack these multi-
parent routing setup schemes. A malicious node can claim
a low level value to attract other nodes, and can use unfair
media access control mechanisms to occupy the wireless
channel. However, protecting routing schemes is beyond
the scope of this paper. Here we assume that the routing set
up scheme is relatively fast, so an adversary doesn’t have
enough time to attack routing set up process. Several mech-
anisms [14, 5] have already been proposed to protect against
attacks to routng set up.
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Figure 3. Techniques to counter anti›trafc
analysis.
3.2 Random Walk
To further diversify routing paths and mitigate rate mon-
itoring attacks, we propose a random walk (RW) routing
scheme. In RW, when a node receives a packet, it forwards
the packet to one of its parent nodes with probability pr.
However, it uses a random forwarding algorithm with prob-
ability 1−pr. In the random forwarding algorithm, the node
forwards the packet to one of its neighbor nodes with equal
probability. Like [13] and [23], MPR and RW use prob-
abilistic routing. However, [13] and [23] use probabilistic
routing for reliable data transmission in sensor networks,
while we use probabilistic routing to defend against rate
monitoring attack.
The RW technique results in some packets traversing a
longer path to reach the base station than the shortest avail-
able path, as shown in Figure 3(c). This implies that RW
will consume more energy per node on an average. To esti-
mate how much extra energy is consumed by RW, we calcu-
late the cost C of RW, where cost is defined as [5]: C = M
′
M
.
Here, M ′ is the average number of hops a packet takes to
reach the base station from an aggregator node in RW, and
M is the number of hops a packet takes to reach the base
station from the same aggregator node in SP. Clearly, M ′
depends on the several factors related to network topology,
e.g. how many neighbors a sensor node has, how far the
base station is from a sensor node or from one of its neigh-
bor nodes, and so on. We calculate the value of C by mak-
ing the following simplifying assumption. Suppose a node
u randomly selects a neighbor node v to forward a packet.
Assume that the distance (number of hops along the shortest
path) between v and the base station is d, while the distance
between u and base station is d′. We assume that the prob-
ability that d > d′ is same as the probability that d < d′.
So on an average, when u forwards a packet to v, the dis-
tance from the base station doesn’t change. Only when u
forwards the packet to its parent node, the distance is re-
duced by 1. We denote n as the number of hops from the
aggregator to the base station in SP, and n′ as the number
of average hops in RW. We have n′×pr = n. This implies
C = M
′
M
= 1
pr
.
In addition, a packet will take a longer time to reach the
base station in RW. In fact, the extra time delay is directly
related (linear) to the extra hops used for forwarding the
packet. So, the time cost for each packet to reach the base
station is roughly 1
pr
in RW.
3.3 Fractal Propagation
MPR and RW spread out data traffic and make it diffi-
cult to use a rate monitoring attack. However, RW is still
vulnerable to time correlation attack. Usually, for a node s,
the number of parent nodes is less than half of s’s neighbor
nodes, and for energy and efficiency considerations, typi-
cally Pr > 0.5. As a result, the possibility that a node for-
wards a packet to its parent node is higher than the possibil-
ity it forwards the packet to any one of its other neighbors.
An adversary can exploit this to launch a time correlation
attack, either by injecting abnormal report data or monitor-
ing over a long period of time.
To address the shortcomings of MPR and RW, we pro-
pose a new technique called fractal propagation. In this
technique, several fake packets are created and propagated
in the network to introduce more randomness in the com-
munication pattern. When a node hears that its neighbor
node is forwarding a packet to the base station, the node
generates a fake packet with probability pc, and forwards
it to one of its neighbor nodes. To control the propagation
range of the fake packet, each newly generated fake packet
contains a length parameter with value K. K is a constant
that is known to all nodes, so an adversary cannot flood the
whole network by sending fake packets with length param-
eter higher than K. When a node receives a fake packet,
it decrements length by 1. If the value of length is greater
than zero, the node forwards the fake packet to one of its
neighbor nodes (not necessarily in the direction of the base
station). If the value of length is zero, a node stops forward-
ing the fake packet. In addition, when a node hears that its
neighbor node is forwarding a fake packet to someone else
with length value k (k < K), it generates and forwards an-
other fake packet with probability pc and length value k−1.
These fake packets spread out in the network and their
transmission paths form a tree (see Figure 3(d)). In particu-
lar, the communication traffic is much more spread out than
RW. So even if an adversary can track a packet using time-
correlation, she cannot track where the real (as opposed to
fake) packet is going. This is because she cannot differen-
tiate between a real and a fake packet without knowing the
encryption key.
Suppose a node has x neighbor nodes on average. Let
pf = pc×x and f(K) represents the total length of a fake
tree that originated with length value K. We have
f(K) = pf×f(K − 1) + f(K − 1) + 1
Solving this recursive equation, we get
f(K) =
K−1∑
i=0
(pf + 1)
i =
{
(pf+1)
K
−1
pf
if pf > 0
K otherwise
Suppose the length of real path from the aggregator node
to the base station is n. The cost is
C =
n + n× pf ×
(pf +1)
K
−1
pf
n
= (pf + 1)
K
If we combine RW and the fractal idea, the total cost is
C =
(pf + 1)
K
pr
If we use fixed values of pr, pf and K, the average cost is
a fixed value that is independent of the size of the network.
3.3.1 Fractal propagation with different forking prob-
abilities
One problem with simple fractal propagation is that it gen-
erates a large amount of traffic near the base station. This
potentially increases the packet collision rate and packet
loss rate.
To address this problem, nodes can use different prob-
abilities to generate fake packets. When a node forwards
packets more frequently, it sets a lower probability for cre-
ating new fake packets. This technique is called Differential
Fractal Propagation (DFP). The algorithm for setting this
probability is as follows. When the packet forwarding rate
r at a node is lower than a threshold h, the node generates
new fake packets with probability p. When the packet for-
warding rate is higher than h, the node generates new fake
packets with probability p′ = p×(h/r)2; h can be chosen
as the packet sending rate of the aggregator node.
3.3.2 Enforced fractal propagation
The idea of fractal propagation aids significantly in spread-
ing out the communication traffic evenly over the network
and obfuscating any paths to the base station. To make mat-
ters worse for an adversary, we generate local high data
sending rate areas, called hot spots, in the network. An
adversary may be trapped in those areas and not be able
to determine the correct path to base station. This routing
technique is called Differential Enforced Fractal Propaga-
tion (DEFP). The challenge here is how to create hot spots
that are evenly spread out in the network, such that only
a minimum (preferably zero) amount of extra communica-
tion/coordination among the sensor nodes is needed.
DEFP is a simple distributed algorithm based on DFP.
The key idea is to let the nodes that forwarded fake packets
earlier have a higher chance to forward fake packets in the
future. In particular, if a node u forwarded a fake packet
to another node v in the past, then it forwards the next fake
packet received to v with a higher probability. The node
uses a lottery scheduling algorithm [22] to choose the next
node to forward the fake packet to. In this algorithm (see
Figure 4), a node assigns tickets to each of its neighbor
nodes. It chooses the next node to forward a fake packet
to based on the number of tickets assigned to the neigh-
bor nodes. A neighbor node with more tickets assigned has
the higher probability of being chosen. In the beginning,
all neighbor nodes are assigned one ticket. When the node
chooses a neighbor node as the next node for forwarding a
fake packet, it increments that node’s tickets by k. This way,
after a node has forwarded a fake packet to one of its neigh-
bor nodes, it will continue to forward other fake packets to
the same neighbor node with higher and higher probabil-
ity. If an area of nodes receive fake packets, they are more
likely to process more and more fake packets in the future.
This will turn that area into a hot spot. It is also very easy
to destroy current hot spots and reconstruct new hot spots
at different places. For example, sensor nodes just reset the
value of tickets to 1 when they receive a broadcast message
from base station, and then start to build hot spots from be-
ginning. To find an area is a hot spot, adversary needs to
observe traffic in that area for a long time, and that will de-
lay her to find location of base station.
3.3.3 Simulation
We simulated our anti-traffic analysis techniques in our sim-
ulator, which is based on a standard discrete event genera-
tor. Simulation results show that RW creates a more dif-
fuse routing pattern than SP, while both fractal propagation
techniques DFP and DEFP considerably obfuscate the lo-
cation of the base station. Figure 5 shows the cumulative
routes taken by packets through a sensor network employ-
ing DEFP. The network configuration for these simulations
is a grid network described in Section 4.
3.4 Node Compromises
If an adversary compromises a node, she can find out
the identity of its parent nodes, and read the contents of all
packets passed through this node. In addition, by monitor-
ing the traffic for some sufficiently long period time, she
can obtain distribution information of all the ancestor nodes
within her activity range. However, with this knowledge.
she cannot determine the location of the base station, and
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cannot block communication between an aggregator node
and the base station. To determine the location of the base
station, the adversary will have to compromise a large num-
ber of nodes along the path to the base station.
One attack against our scheme is to find the geographic
direction of the base station by compromising two nodes
at different locations. If each node’s parent node is in the
direction towards the location of the base station, an adver-
sary can intersect the two direction vectors to determine the
approximate location of the base station. However, this at-
tack requires that the direction of a parent node be precisely
towards base station, which is quite unlikely in a randomly
distributed sensor network. In addition, MPR increases the
difficulty in determining the precise geographic direction
towards the base station, forcing the adversary to compro-
mise many more nodes.
In fractal propagation, if an adversary compromises a
node, she can find out whether a packet is a fake packet
or real. However, she cannot obtain any information other
than the ones discussed above (in RW case). An adversary
can attempt to launch a DoS attack by generating many fake
packets and forwarding them to flood the network. How-
ever, the propagation area of a fake packet is limited by the
value of the length parameter. A fake packet can propagate
and generate new fake packets only within a small part of
the network, so the damage due to such DoS attack is lim-
ited.
Finally, an adversary can also generate several forged
data packets and forward them to the base station in an at-
tempt to flood the base station. However, mechanisms exist
currently that allow intermediate nodes to filter out forged
aggregation data, e.g. see [24, 26]. In SEF [24], interme-
diate nodes use randomly pre-distributed pair-wise keys to
verify the authenticity of the data sent by the aggregator
node. Any forged packets are filtered out by each interme-
diate node with certain probability and don’t propagate over
a long path.
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Figure 5. Number of packets sent/forwarded
by each node in DEFP.
4 Evaluation
4.1 Evaluation Criteria
The main goal of anti-traffic analysis techniques is to
prevent an adversary from tracking the location of a base
station by analyzing communication patterns of a WSN over
some reasonable period of time. Our goal is to make com-
munication patterns as random as possible while minimiz-
ing costs, so that an adversary does not have sufficient in-
formation to deduce the location of the base station in a
reasonable amount of time. Our evaluation focuses on how
random the network traffic is, and the cost for our anti-traffic
analysis schemes. We haven’t simulated the effectiveness of
defending against time-correlation attacks. A higher fork-
ing probability (Pf ) and a longer length of fake path will
make it more difficult to launch a time correlation attack.
Instead, we evaluate the the randomness of network traffic
and effectiveness against rate monitoring attacks through
two metrics —entropy of the network traffic and the GSAT
test. To estimate the cost of our techniques, we count the
number of messages exchanged in our techniques and com-
pare them with the number of messages exchanged in SP.
Since our techniques incur very little memory cost on each
sensor node, e.g. keys and tickets of its neighbor nodes, we
have not measured it in our simulation.
Size Average # Number of Sending
Neighbors Aggregators Rate
Grid 81×81 8 28 4/minute
Random 4500 20 28 4/minute
Table 1. Network conguration Parameters
In addition to randomness, the exact values of entropy
and the GSAT test depend on several other network charac-
teristics, e.g. network structure, network size, number and
location of aggregator nodes. To evaluate our techniques,
we have focused on differences in entropy and GSAT test
values measured under the cases when one of the proposed
anti-traffic analysis techniques is used and the case when
no anti-traffic analysis technique is used. We also experi-
mented with different values of Pr in RW and Pf in DEFP,
to understand the effects of these parameters. We simulated
two network structures in our experiments: a grid topology
and a random topology. Table 1 shows the parameters used
in our simulation.
Entropy We use entropy to measure the randomness of
network traffic. Entropy is a mathematical measure of in-
formation uncertainty, and it has been widely used as a met-
ric to measure randomness in many applications, e.g. data
communication, data compression, random number genera-
tors, and security of cryptographic algorithms. Entropy of
a random variable X with a probability function p(x) is de-
fined as H(X) = −
∑
p(x)log2p(x). Suppose that during
a time period T , a sensor node a sent/forwarded pa packets,
and a total of M packets were sent/forwarded in the WSN
N . We use the following formula to measure the entropy of
N during the time period T : H(N) = −
∑
a∈N
pa
M
log2
pa
M
.
In general, a higher value of H(N) implies that the com-
munication traffic pattern of N is more random.
GSAT Test The GSAT test is intended to measure the
ability of a routing technique to guard against heuristic-
based algorithms that an adversary may use to locate a base
station. The GSAT algorithm [19] was proposed for solv-
ing NP-hard satisfiability problems, such as the 3SAT prob-
lem [4]. In contrast to the traditional deterministic solu-
tions, GSAT is a probabilistic algorithm that combines a
hill-climbing search algorithm with a random restart mech-
anism. GSAT can solve most of the large 3SAT instances in
a short time.
We use the idea of the GSAT algorithm to design a
heuristic-based algorithm that an adversary uses to track the
location of the base station. In this algorithm, an adversary
starts at some location in the sensor network N . She moni-
tors network traffic around her within her activity range. If
she finds that a different node s within her activity range has
the highest traffic, she moves to s, and continues to moni-
tor traffic from s. Using this mechanism, she can move to-
Entropy Traffic Center Traffic
(SP) (BR) (SP) (BR) (SP) (BR)
Grid 9.64 11.40 39000 7×106 10080 4×105
Random 8.20 12.08 21000 5×106 2792 1.8×105
Table 2. Entropy and Number of messages ex›
changed in SP and BR. (Trafc means the
total messages exchanged in the network,
and Center Trafc means the number of mes›
sages exchanged in the close vicinity of the
base station.)
wards the locations that have higher and higher traffic vol-
ume. However, if she reaches a location that has the highest
traffic with in the neighborhood (local maxima), she selects
a direction at random, moves in that direction for some time,
and then repeats the above algorithm. She continues to do
this until she finds the base station.
The GSAT test measures the average number of hops an
adversary takes to finally reach the base station using this
heuristic algorithm. A large value of GSAT test implies that
the routing technique has better potential to guard against
heuristic-based algorithms that an adversary may use to lo-
cate a base station.
4.2 Effectiveness and Cost of Anti-Traffic Analy-
sis Techniques
To evaluate the effectiveness of our anti-traffic analy-
sis techniques, we simulated them over a grid network
(see Table 1) and measured the values of entropy, GSAT
test, and energy cost (number of messages exchanged).
We simulated the following techniques: MPR, MPR+RW,
MPR+RW+DFP, and MPR+RW+DEFP. For simplicity, we
use MPR, RW, DFP, and DEFP respectively to refer to these
techniques in the rest of the paper. In these simulations, we
set Pr to 0.6, Pf to 0.2, and K to 6. To obtain an estimate
of an upper bound of entropy and GSAT values, we sim-
ulated a routing mechanism in which every message sent
by aggregator node is flooded to the entire network. We
call this scheme a broadcast(BR) scheme. Since a broad-
cast scheme generates uniform network traffic, an adversary
cannot obtain any clue about the location of base station.
Table 2 shows the entropy values and number of messages
exchanged in SP and broadcast schemes.
Figure 6 (a) shows the entropy measured for various
routing techniques. All data reported here are an average
over 20 runs. As expected, entropy is lowest for SP and
highest for broadcast. Entropy for MPR and RW is higher
than SP, but lower than DFP and DEFP. This shows that
the idea of generating fake packets in a controlled manner
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Figure 6. Effectiveness and cost of anti›trafc analysis mechanisms.
does aid in making the network traffic pattern more random.
This is in addition to the original goal of defending against
time-correlation analysis.
To determine resiliency against a GSAT search, we sim-
ulated the data traffic and recorded the number of packets
sent/forwarded by each node in a log file. We initialized
a starting point for the adversary in the network and used
the GSAT algorithm to discover the base station area. We
recorded the number of steps the adversary takes to get into
the base station area. For each log file, we set 81 different
initial locations. For each initial location, we ran GSAT to
search for the base station area for 100 times, and recorded
the number of hops the adversary takes to get into the base
station area. Finally, we computed the average number of
hops the adversary takes to get into the base station area for
each technique. In addition, we experimented with three
different activity ranges of the adversary: adversary could
monitor data traffic over 3×3, 5×5, and 9×9 areas around
her respectively.
Figure 6 (b) shows the results of the GSAT test. First,
we see that the GSAT values correlates with the entropy
values shown in Figure 6 (a) (except DEFP). Higher en-
tropy corresponds to a larger value of GSAT. This implies
that both entropy and GSAT are useful metrics to measure
the randomness in network traffic. The only exception is
DEFP. Since DEFP converges some traffic together to form
hot spots, it results in less entropy compared to DFP. How-
ever, those hot spots make it more difficult for an adversary
to locate the base station using a GSAT search algorithm.
The activity range of an adversary also impacts the
GSAT value. If the activity range is larger, the correspond-
ing GSAT value is smaller. This implies that the adversary
can find the base station in less number of hops. Also, we
notice that anti-traffic analysis techniques significantly in-
crease the number of steps an adversary has to take to lo-
cate the base station. For example, she can discover the
base station area in 34 steps in SP (activity range 3×3),
and 653 steps in DEFP, which is about 19 times more. No-
tice that the number of steps needed in broadcast method is
only about 1.5 times the number of steps needed in DEFP
approach. On the other hand, broadcast costs (number of
messages) about 70 times more than DEFP. Even when the
activity range of the adversary is large (9×9), our anti-
traffic analysis techniques significantly increase the number
of hops an adversary has to take to locate the base station
area.
Figures 6 (c) shows the energy overhead of our tech-
niques. We are interested in the overall energy overhead
of the network, and also the energy overhead of nodes in
the vicinity of the base station. The energy overhead is crit-
ical, because it affects the lifetime of a sensor node, as well
as the packet loss rate caused by packet collisions. We are
particularly interested in energy overhead in the nodes near
the base station, because these nodes typically carry larger
amounts of traffic, and any problem with these nodes may
cause serious communication problems in the WSN.
Figure 6 (c) shows the total number of messages
sent/forwarded by all nodes in the network, and the number
of messages sent/forwarded by nodes near the base station
(which is an area of 20×20 nodes with base station at cen-
ter). The traffic in RW is about 1.8 times larger than the
traffic in SP for the whole network and the area near the
base station. The message cost of DFP and DEFP is about
2.8 times the message cost of SP in the whole network, and
2.4 times near the base station. In our simulation, when ag-
gregators send four packets per minute, the nodes directly
connected to the base station forward about 14 packets per
minutes in SP, and about 34 packets per minute in DEFP.
This is easily feasible in the current sensor network tech-
nology. Note that the message cost of these algorithms is
constant, and doesn’t increase with increase in network size.
4.3 Effectiveness of Pr and Pf
To understand the effect of different values of Pr and Pf ,
we varied parameters for random walk RW and fractal prop-
agation DEFP. We simulated them on both a grid network
and a random network (Table 1). In RW, we varied Pr from
0.3 to 0.95. In DEFP, we fixed Pr at 0.6, and varied Pf from
0.1 to 0.65. The results are shown in Figures 7 and 8. From
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Figure 8. Effectiveness of Pr and Pf (Random network).
these figures, the variation in the values of entropy and mes-
sage cost based on Pr and Pf is similar in both grid and ran-
dom networks. In RW, the entropy sub-linearly decreases
and the number of messages decreases with increasing Pr.
In DEFP, entropy sub-linearly increases and the number of
messages dramatically increases with increasing Pf .
These results imply that we should chose Pf as small as
possible, as long as it satisfies our requirements. In Sec-
tion 3, we analyzed the relation between message cost, and
Pr and Pf . The results from these experiments imply that
there is a relation between the entropy of network traffic,
and Pr and Pf , which is independent of the size of the net-
work. Another observation is that although the total number
of messages exchanged is quite large for very large values of
Pf , the number of messages exchanged near the base station
doesn’t change a lot. That shows the traffic control mech-
anism proposed in DFP (and used in DEFP) works quite
well.
5 Related Work
Sensor network security has been a critical issue in sen-
sor network research. e.g. secure data communcation [16],
secure routing [14, 12, 5], and secure data aggregation [18],
etc. In addition, much research has been performed in the
area of setting up pairwise secret keys between different
sensor nodes. Examples include [8, 3, 7, 15, 25].
In the area of privacy in E-commerce, many techniques
have been developed to protect the anonymity of message
senders and receivers. Our anti-traffic analysis techniques
are similar to the methods used in traditional privacy and
anonymity research, but we have 3 unique properties: First,
we focus on hiding physical location of base station, instead
of the identity of message sender or receiver. Second, the
communication pattern in sensor network is highly asym-
metric and converge on base station. That make it more
difficult to protect base station against traffic analysis at-
tack. Third, the communication and computing resources
in traditional network are too expensive to current sensor
network platform, so we cannot directly apply their mecha-
nisms to sensor network.
In traditional privacy research, mist routing requires the
pre-deployed, hierarchical and trusted routers [2]. [10] re-
quires that every node can talk to every other node. The
Onion routing protocol [9] disguises who talks to whom
on the Internet by layered encryption and by forwarding
received messages in a random order. In addition, a large
number of messages are stored before forwarding them in a
different order. A sensor node doesn’t have enough memory
to store many packets. The k-anonymous message trans-
mission protocol proposed in [1] protects anonymity for
both sender and receiver with low data transmission latency.
Unfortunately, its high communication and computational
requirements prevent it from being used in sensor networks.
The techniques to disguise a receiver by routing each mes-
sage to multiple receivers using a multicast mechanism are
proposed in [17, 20]. Tor [6] is the second-generation
onion router, which is a circuit-based low-latency anony-
mous communication service on the Internet. However, it
needs to set up a large number of directory servers, which
is difficult to envision in sensor networks.
Recently, A. Wadaa et. al proposed schemes to random-
ize communications during network setup phase, to protect
anonymity of sensor network infrastructure [21]. In our
work, we focus on defending against traffic analysis in data
sending phase. In addition, we assume adversary can do
some active attacks such as has inject traffic to the network,
and compromising sensor nodes.
6 Conclusion
A base station controls the operation of a WSN, and nat-
urally becomes a prime target of attack by adversaries. This
paper addresses one aspect of protecting base stations by
making it difficult for an adversary to locate a base sta-
tion. The paper presents four anti-traffic analysis tech-
niques, MPR, RW, DFP and DEFP that prevent the location
of a base station from being easily discovered by an adver-
sary. In MPR and RW, random walks and some amount of
randomness are introduced in the multi-hop path a packet
takes from a sensor node to a base station. In DFP, fractal
propagation and random fake paths are introduced to con-
fuse an adversary from tracking a packet as it moves to-
wards a base station. Finally, in DEFP, multiple, random
areas of high communication activity are created to con-
fuse an adversary into searching in a wrong area. The pa-
per evaluates these techniques analytically and via a sim-
ulation using three evaluation criteria: total entropy of the
network, total energy consumed, and the ability to guard
against heuristic-based techniques to locate a base station.
The combination of random walks, fractal propagation, and
hot spots are shown to increase the search effort required by
an adversary to discover a base station.
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